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Abstract:
The threat of DPA attacks is of crucial importance when designing cryptographic
hardware. This contribution discusses the DPA-resistant implementation of two eS-
TREAM finalists using SABL logic styles. Particularly, two Feedback Shift Regis-
ter (FSR) based stream ciphers, Grain v.1 and Trivium are designed in both BSim3
130nm and typical 350nm technologies and simulated by HSpice software. Circuit
simulations and statistical power analysis show that DPA resistivity of SABL imple-
mentation of both stream ciphers has a major improvement. The paper presents the
tradeoffs involved in the circuit design and the design for performance issues.
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1 Introduction
The term of security for a cryptographic primitive can be considered from two points of view: math-
ematical security (resistance against classical cryptanalysis) and the second one is physical security.
Physical attacks on cryptographic devices take advantage of implementation-specific characteristics to
recover the secret parameters. They are therefore much less general since they are specific to a given
implementation but often much more powerful than classical cryptanalysis, and are considered very se-
riously by cryptographic devices implementors. A side-channel attack occurs when an attacker is able
to use some additional information leaked from the implementation of a cryptographic function to crypt-
analyze the function. Clearly, given enough side-channel information, it is trivial to break a cipher. One
side channel attack in particular, namely the differential power analysis (DPA) is of great concern. It
was first reported by Kocher et al. in 1998 that the power consumption of a smart card could reveal
the secret key of the cryptographic algorithm [1]. DPA is a well-known and thoroughly studied threat
for implementations of block ciphers (DES and AES), public key algorithms (RSA) and recently stream
ciphers (Grain and Trivium [4]).
Stream ciphers as part of the symmetric key cryptography family, have always had the reputation
of efficiency in hardware and speed. They have attracted much attention since the beginning of the
eSTREAM project in 2004. Although there is vast literature about DPA on implementations of block
ciphers and public key algorithms, only few publications can be found about DPA attacks on stream
ciphers ([2], [3], [4], [8], [13], [14]).
In power analysis attacks, it is assumed that the power consumption of a circuit is correlated to the
data handled. An attacker can therefore recover secret information by simply monitoring the power
signals of a running device.
Stream ciphers require frequent synchronization to prevent synchronization loss between sender and
receiver. Normally the initialization will be done with the same secret key and with a different initial
value IV. So an attacker can disrupt the synchronization and apply a new known IV and measure the
power traces in the initialization phase to apply a DPA on the embedded system of the stream cipher. So
far, there is only one report on a practical DPA targeting hardware implementations of stream ciphers
[4]. In that paper, a chosen IV DPA attack on Grain and Trivium stream ciphers has been described and
executed. Protecting implementations against DPA attacks is usually difficult and expensive. The goal of
countermeasures against DPA attacks is to make the power consumption independent of intermediate val-
ues of the stream cipher. In general, there are three basic groups into which these countermeasures can be
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characterized: protocol countermeasures, algorithmic countermeasures, and hardware countermeasures
[11].
The principles of the countermeasures can be implemented at different levels in a cryptographic
device. In general, these techniques are theoretical countermeasures and only reduce the side channel
leakage and do not fundamentally prevent a DPA. But the advantage of these countermeasures is to make
the attack significantly harder. In this article, we provide a brief overview of hiding and masking logic
styles (hardware countermeasures) and particularly we will use sense amplifier base logic (SABL) for
secure implementation of stream ciphers. SABL is a logic style that uses a fixed amount of charge for
every transition, including the degenerated events in which a gate does not change state. In every cycle,
a SABL gate charges a total capacitance with a constant value.
So far, there has not been a unified architecture which can be used as a test bench for applicability
of logic styles on stream ciphers. Regarding this, two FSR-based stream ciphers - Grain v.1 and Trivium
stream ciphers - are implemented in cell level to find out the tradeoffs involved in designing the archi-
tecture and performance issues. Power traces of the resulting circuits exhibit that SABL significantly
reduces signal to noise ratio (SNR). The rest of the paper is structured as follows: a general model of
power analysis attack on stream ciphers is given in Section 2. Section 3 describes an overview of DPA
Countermeasures on cell level. In sections 4 and 5 the descriptions of Grain v.1 and Trivium are ex-
plained. Design and simulation issues are described in section 6 and finally, conclusions are drawn in
Section 7.
2 Differential Power Analysis of Stream Ciphers
DPA is based on the fact that CMOS logic and application specific details cause logic operations to
have power characteristics that depend on the input data. It relies further on statistical analysis and error
correction to extract the information from the power consumption that is correlated to the secret key [1].
In a DPA a hypothetical model of the device under attack is used to predict the power consumption. The
classical setup for a DPA on stream ciphers is illustrated in Fig. 1. Output power traces are determined
by the input data, IV, private key, output of the device and by many other parameters. An attacker to
some extent has the potential knowledge of some of them (e.g. IV, input data and output data) while
others are unknown. Regarding a DPA attack, multiple measurements of the power consumption of a
cryptographic device are made. For each measurement, different chosen IV’s are sent to the device.
Since the cryptographic algorithm is known, a hypothesis on intermediate values can be used to calculate
the targeted data values based on the random input values. If the correct hypothesis is used, the targeted
data values are calculated correctly for all measurements. According to (1), the total power consumption
of an embedded device depends on 3 factors:
PTotal = PCons. +PNoise +PDD. (1)
With the help of statistical methods (calculation of correlations, mean values, etc.), the randomness of the
data values that are not targeted (PConst. : leakage currents and data independent power consumption and
PNoise: which comes from electrical noise) is exploited to reduce their effects on the power consumption
traces. PDD is the data dependent power consumption and is targeted in statistical analysis. After all,
the result of the statistical operation indicates which key hypothesis is correct. Normally, a hamming
distance power model is used to map the transitions that occur at the outputs of cells of a netlist to
power consumption values. In CMOS gates, it is reasonable to assume that the main component of the
data dependent power consumption is the dynamic power consumption which is the power dissipation of
charging and discharging of output capacitance nodes (P0→1 or P1→0). In a CMOS gate, we can express
dynamic power consumption by:
PDynamic = N ·CL · f ·V 2DD (2)
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where CL is the gate load capacitance and N is the probability of a 0 → 1 or 1 → 0 output transition
and f is the clock frequency. This equation shows that the power consumption of CMOS circuits is
data dependent. Note that N is the most important factor in the hypothetical model. There are different
techniques for calculation of it. For example, a variable gate delay model can be used for measuring the
number of transitions and glitches of a circuit [7]. This technique can be easily applied to circuits by
using a VHDL simulator in Register Transfer Level.
Figure 1: Differential power analysis model of stream ciphers.
3 DPA Countermeasures on Cell Level
So far, several methods in different ways have been proposed to counteract DPA attacks. In this
section different known DPA countermeasures on cell level (hiding and masking techniques) are briefly
presented and then their merits and disadvantages will be discussed.
The first structured approach to counteract DPA attacks at the cell level was the use of hiding logic
styles. These styles try to break the correlation between an algorithm’s intermediate results and the power
consumption of the cryptographic device that executes this algorithm by making the instantaneous power
consumption of the cells either random or the same in each clock cycle. The three major types of hiding
logic styles are: Dual-Rail Precharge (DRP), Asynchronous, and Current Mode Logic (CML). DRP
logic styles are the most popular types. For instance, SABL [10] and Wave Dynamic Differential Logic
(WDDL) [15] are dual rail precharge logic styles whose logic gates are driven by a precharge signal
to prevent glitches, and each logic signal is represented by two complementary wires. Other examples
of DRP logic styles are Dual Spacer Dual Rail logic (DSDR), Three-phase Dual-rail Precharge Logic
(TDPL) [16], and Three State Dynamic Logic (3SDL). Data dependent time of evaluation of the WDDL
and its memory effect made it vulnerable to DPA attacks. One of the major drawbacks of hiding logic
styles is the balancing of the cells and interconnect layouts to achieve constant power consumption. Since
the charge and discharge of output nodes of dynamic and differential styles follow simple RC charge and
discharge, cells and wires must mainly be balanced in a capacitive and resistive manner. But due to
process variations, complex cross-coupling effects, and area limitations it is a hard task.
Besides hiding, masking at the cell level has become popular during the past few years. Using
a masked logic style, designers also break the correlation between an algorithm’s intermediate values
and the power consumption of the cryptographic device that executes this algorithm. All intermediate
values are masked by a random value. The cells then process only the masked intermediate values and
their corresponding mask. Because the unmasked values and the masked value are uncorrelated, power
consumption of the cell also remains uncorrelated to intermediate values. Generally there are two types
of masking operation: boolean masking or arithmetic masking. If the masked cells are not activated in a
data or operation dependent manner, masked logic styles counteract DPA attacks. There are two different
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possible masking schemes: one mask per circuit (single masking) or one mask per signal. These masked
bits are normally prepared by some random number/sequence generators.
Before, masking was mainly used at the architecture level. As a result, only a few practical results
are available for this type of cell level countermeasure. For examples Masked Dual rail Precharge Logic
(MDPL) [17] and Dual rail Random Switching Logic (DRSL) [18] were introduced by combining the
masking scheme and dual rail precharge logic in order to use semi custom design tools without routing
constrains. Designers can implement MDPL cells using commonly available conventional single rail
standard cells. Only sequential cells are connected to the clock signal, and combinational cells precharge
their outputs when their inputs have been set to the precharge value. The memory effect can reduce the
DPA resistance of masked logic styles. Practical evaluations of the manufactured chips have also shown
that early propagation is also a major threat to the DPA resistancy of masked logic styles.
Although all these efforts, it has been shown ([19], [20], [21]) that MDPL leaks information. For
example in [19], it has been shown that MDPL is susceptible to the early propagation effect. In order
to combat the early propagation issues, the designers of MDPL introduced a so called improved MDPL
(iMDPL). In each iMDPL gate there is an evaluation precharge detection unit, which consists of three
(CMOS) AND gates and two (CMOS) OR gates. Hence it is not surprising that the area requirements for
iMDPL gates increased significantly compared to MDPL gates. Another threat to masked circuits is the
detection of the mask value, which lets attackers completely cancel out the effect of masking in a DPA
attack. In particular, such an attack is dangerous for single masked circuits, where only one mask value
is used for all signals in the circuit. Increasing the number of mask values per circuit is an option but it
is impractical regarding its high complexity and area utilization.
4 Sense Amplifier Based Logic
In this paper we will concentrate on SABL [10] for DPA resistive implementation of stream ciphers.
SABL is part of the DRP logic styles. Fig. 2 shows the transistor schematic of standard SABL gate
library used for implementation of ciphers. Equation (3) illustrates the power consumption of a SABL
gate,
P = CL · f ·V 2DD +CClk · f ·V 2DD (3)
where CL represents the total output capacitance of the gate and CClk is the clock propagation circuitry
capacitance. As can be seen in the Fig.2, SABL gates can be designed using Differential Pull Down
Networks (DPDN) or Differential Pull Up Networks (DPUN), controlled respectively by clk and clk.
This allows two modes for cascading SABL gates: domino connection (by connecting the outputs of the
gate to the inputs of the next gate through inverters) or NP-connection (N-gates followed by P-gates like
in NP-logic).
In SABL, the concepts of dual rail and precharge logic are combined to achieve constant power con-
sumption. Precharging breaks a signal’s sequence of values by splitting each clock cycle into precharge
and evaluation phases. In the precharge phase, the complementary wires encoding a signal are set to
a predefined precharge value, such as 1. In the subsequent evaluation phase, one of the two comple-
mentary wires is set to 1 according to the actual value that is processed. As a result, for each signal in
a circuit, exactly one 0→ 1 transition and one 1→ 0 transition occur in a clock cycle. By ensuring a
balance between the complementary wires between cells on the one hand and a balance of the internal
structure of the cells on the other hand, designers can achieve constant power consumption. The price
is high power consumption and high current spikes of these gates which appear at the beginning of the
precharge phase. By the use of delayed clock mechanism introduced in [13] and [14] we can reduce the
peak of these spikes.
But in practice the throughput is highly dependent on layout design of the chip to have balanced
complementary wires. Since the charge and discharge of output nodes of differential styles follow simple
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Figure 2: (i) SABL D-flip flop (ii) SABL Nand2 gate (iii) SABL Xor2 gate
RC charge and discharge, cells and wires must mainly be balanced in a capacitive and resistive manner.
But due to process variations, complex cross-coupling effects, and area limitations this is hard to achieve.
Avoiding these effects often requires custom cell design, which involves considerably more design effort
than using available standard cells.
5 Grain Stream Cipher
Grain v.1 [5] is a stream cipher introduced in 2005 as a candidate for the hardware profile of eS-
TREAM project. Grain v.1 is a binary additive synchronous stream cipher with an internal state of
160 bits si, si+1,. . . , si+79 and bi, bi+1,. . . , bi+79 residing in a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) and
a nonlinear feedback shift register (NLFSR), respectively. The design of the algorithm mainly targets
hardware environments where gate count, power consumption and memory is very limited. The key size
of Grain is 80 bits (ki, 0≤ i ≤ 79). Additionally, an initial value of 64 bits (IVi, 0≤ i ≤ 63) is required.
In initialization phase, all 80 NLFSR elements are loaded with the key bits, (bi = ki, 0 ≤ i ≤ 79), then
the first 64 LFSR elements are loaded with the IV bits, (si = IVi, 0 ≤ i ≤ 63). The last 16 bits of the
LFSR are filled with ones. f (x) and g(x) are two polynomials used as feedback function for the LFSR
and NLFSR.
f : si+80 = si+62⊕ si+51⊕ si+38⊕ si+23⊕ si+13⊕ si (4)
g : bi+80 = si⊕bi⊕bi+9⊕bi+14⊕bi+21⊕bi+28⊕bi+33⊕bi+37⊕bi+45⊕bi+52⊕bi+60⊕
bi+62⊕bi+63 ·bi+60⊕bi+37 ·bi+33⊕bi+15 ·bi+9⊕bi+60 ·bi+52 ·bi+45⊕
bi+33 ·bi+28 ·bi+21⊕bi+63 ·bi+45 ·bi+28 ·bi+9⊕bi+60 ·bi+52 ·bi+37 ·bi+33⊕
bi+63 ·bi+60 ·bi+21 ·bi+15⊕bi+63 ·bi+60 ·bi+52 ·bi+45 ·bi+37⊕ (5)
bi+33 ·bi+28 ·bi+21 ·bi+15 ·bi+9⊕bi+52 ·bi+45 ·bi+37 ·bi+33 ·bi+28 ·bi+21
The output function h(x) uses as input selected bits from both feedback shift registers:
h(x) = x1⊕ x4⊕ x0 · x3⊕ x2 · x3⊕ x3 · x4⊕ x0 · x1 · x2⊕
+ x0 · x2 · x3⊕ x0 · x2 · x4⊕ x1 · x2 · x4⊕ x2 · x3 · x4 (6)
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where the variables x0, x1, x2, x3, and x4 corresponds to the tap positions si+3, si+25, si+46, si+64 and
bi+63 respectively. The output of the filter function is masked with the some state bits from the NFSR to
produce the keystream zi:
zi = bi+1⊕bi+2⊕bi+4⊕bi+10⊕bi+31⊕bi+43⊕bi+56⊕h(si+3,si+25,si+46,si+64,bi+63)
This output is used during the initialization phase as additional feedback to LFSR and NLFSR.
During normal operation this value is used as key stream output. The generated output bits per clock
cycle is called Radix. By implementing the small feedback functions, f (x) and g(x), and the output
function several times the speed of Grain can easily reach up to Radix-32.
6 Trivium Stream Cipher
Trivium [6] is a stream cipher introduced in 2005 as a candidate for the hardware profile of the
eSTREAM project. Trivium has an internal state of 288 bits ai,ai+1, . . . ,ai+92, bi,bi+1, . . . ,bi+83 and
ci,ci+1, . . . ,ci+110 - residing in three coupled NLFSRs A, B, and C of 93, 84, and 111 bits respectively.
Trivium has a key k = (k0, . . . ,k79) of 80 bits as well as an initial value IV = (IV0, ..., IV79) of 80 bits.
The initialization of the key and IV is done as follows:


(a0, . . . ,a92) = (0, . . . ,0,k79, . . . ,k0)
(b0, . . . ,b83) = (0,0,0,0, IV79, . . . , IV0)
(c0, . . . ,c110) = (1,1,1,0,0, . . . ,0,0)
(7)
Then, the state is updated over 4 full cycles, according to (3), but without generating key stream bits.
After 1152 clocking it outputs a key stream bit zi.


ai+93 = ai+24⊕ ci⊕ (ci+1 · ci+2)⊕ ci+45
bi+84 = bi+6⊕ai⊕ (ai+1 ·ai+2)⊕ai+27
ci+111 = ci+24⊕bi⊕ (bi+1 ·bi+2)⊕bi+15
(8)
zi = ai⊕bi⊕ ci⊕ai+27⊕bi+15⊕ ci+45 (9)
Trivium has a very simple structure that is well suited for different Radix implementations from
Radix-1 to Radix-64 without noticeable hardware penalties.
The basic structure of the Grain v.1 and Trivium stream ciphers are shown in Fig. 3. In April 15,
2008, the eSTREAM competition was finished and according to the final report [12] both ciphers were
selected among the four finalists of the H/W profile.
7 Design and Simulation Results
Both eSTREAM candidates are modeled at transistor level using a spice netlist. Circuit design of
Grain v.1 and Trivium are mainly based on the techniques presented in [13] and [14]. In order to specify
the impact of minimum feature size on the design, ciphers are designed using two technologies: typical
BSIM3 0.13µm CMOS SOI technology and typical 0.35µm CMOS SOI technology. Spice simulations
were run to test the circuits by test vectors provided by the inventors of the ciphers using Hspice circuit
simulator and C compiler. Domino cascading scheme is used for all SABL gate connections to make
sure having a 0→ 1 transition in the input of all cascaded gates to prevent possible glitches. First a new
standard gate library based on SABL logic is designed. Minimum possible sized transistors are used to
lower the total capacitance to get lower dynamic power in (2). This will also minimize the charging time
330 Reza Ebrahimi Atani, Sattar Mirzakuchaki, Shahabaddin Ebrahimi Atani, Willi Meier
Figure 3: (i) Grain stream cipher (ii) Trivium stream cipher.
during precharge phase. Besides, this will help to cut the current spikes in the beginning of the precharge
phase of each cycle. In order to get rid of the spikes, a delayed clocking mechanism is used [13], [14].
In order to increase security and speed of the initialization phase, a parallel data loading scheme is
used, since in case of serial bit loading a straight forward simple power analysis attack is very likely
to be successful in recovering all key bits. In parallel loading, key and IV will be loaded in the state
bits after the first rising edge of the CLK signal. The gate level architecture of the parallel data loading
scheme for standard CMOS is shown in Fig. 4. Note that in case of SABL all the wires and gates are
dual rail. The area overhead is three Nand2 gates for each FlipFlop of the FSRs in the ciphers. Since all
the components in the architecture need aCLK signal for switching from precharge phase into evaluation
and vice versa, a chained buffer clock signal is needed. For the standard CMOS implementation of a the
stream ciphers, standard two input Nand gates (4 Transistors), 8 transistor two input Xor gates, and the
former 24 transistor, edge triggered D-FlipFlops (using eight Nand2), are used. In order to monitor all
current variations, one sample has been taken every 50ps. Both simulations were run for four different
80-bit keys and IV’s (64 bit IV for Grain v.1) in both SABL and standard CMOS designs. All power sim-
ulations are observed by 5MHz clock signal. The average power consumption per cycle was extracted by
averaging the power consumption on 100 consecutive clock cycles. Then, the Mean Power Consumption
(MPC), the Power Consumption Standard Deviation (PCSD), the Normalized Energy Deviation (NED)
and Normalized Standard Deviation (NSD) were extracted for each simulated logic style (10). For ex-
ample Supply current traces for standard CMOS design of Grain v.1 for the choice of K2, IV3 (in Table
1) in initialization phase is shown in Fig. 5.
NED =
max(energy/cycle)−min(energy/cycle)
max(energy/cycle)
,NSD =
PCSD
MPC
(10)
In terms of transistor cost, the complete Trivium (including parallel data loading and clock buffering
circuitary) required ≈ 23000 transistors for the SABL and ≈ 8500 transistors for the standard CMOS.
In case of Grain v.1, ≈ 13500 transistors for the SABL and ≈ 6000 transistors for the standard CMOS
are needed, confirming more than two times higher hardware cost for SABL styles. Table 1 shows the
summary of final statistical power analysis results. For example in 0.13µm technology, and for K1, IV1,
for Grain v.1, PCSDSABL
PCSDSCMOS
= 0.016 which shows that the power consumption fluctuations of SABL im-
plementation is nearly 1.6% of standard CMOS (Power = Current×Costant Supply Voltage). This is a
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Figure 4: Parallel data loading scheme in FSRs (standard CMOS)
Figure 5: supply current variation of Standard CMOS design of Grain v.1 in 350nm technology
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Table 1: Statistical power analysis of Trivium and Grain v.1 for different 80 bit hexadecimal key and IV’s
(K1 = AA . . .A, K2 = 80 . . .0, IV1 = 55 . . .5, IV2 = FF . . .F , IV3 = 00 . . .0, IV4 = 11 . . .1). [Note that in case of Grain v.1 the IV’s are 64 bits]
Stream Cipher Trivium Grain
Trivium MPC [µW ] PCSD [µW ] NED NSD MPC [µW ] PCSD [µW ] NED NSD
SABL 0.35µm,Vdd = 3.3V,VT N = 0.6V,VT P =−0.85V
K1, IV1 949 1.2632 0.0091 0.00133 616 0.9497 0.0136 0.00154
K1, IV2 940 1.2469 0.0106 0.00132 605 0.9375 0.0111 0.00155
K2, IV3 938 1.2403 0.0089 0.00131 601 0.9318 0.0122 0.00155
K2, IV4 943 1.2531 0.0117 0.00133 611 0.9393 0.0120 0.00153
S-CMOS 0.35µm,Vdd = 3.3V,VT N = 0.6V,VT P =−0.85V
K1, IV1 641 49.1 0.3292 0.0766 421 26.8 0.2784 0.0636
K1, IV2 637 19.3 0.2351 0.0303 402 18.5 0.1905 0.0460
K2, IV3 629 23.5 0.3139 0.0374 397 17.1 0.2187 0.0430
K2, IV4 635 41.7 0.2842 0.0657 415 29.6 0.3882 0.0713
SABL 0.13µm,Vdd = 1.2V,VT N = 0.4V,VT P =−0.39V
K1, IV1 545 0.8435 0.0061 0.0015 378 0.7610 0.0124 0.0020
K1, IV2 537 0.7927 0.0054 0.0014 371 0.7424 0.0082 0.0020
K2, IV3 536 0.7831 0.0050 0.0014 369 0.7291 0.0079 0.0019
K2, IV4 541 0.8237 0.0059 0.0015 374 0.7482 0.0101 0.0020
S-CMOS 0.13µm,Vdd = 1.2V,VT N = 0.4V,VT P =−0.39V
K1, IV1 337 31.20 0.8945 0.0926 258 22.50 0.7889 0.0872
K1, IV2 321 16.12 0.8191 0.0190 246 14.14 0.8026 0.0545
K2, IV3 319 17.14 0.8614 0.0537 242 12.31 0.8402 0.0509
K2, IV4 326 29.94 0.9218 0.0918 252 21.72 0.7924 0.0862
major improvement but still PCSDSABL 6= 0 and very small current variations are detectable. The overall
comparison between SABL and standard CMOS design for 4 different key and IV choices (Table 1) is
shown in Table 2. DPA resistivity factor is calculated in (11):
DPA Resistivity ∝
1
PCSD
(11)
One of the fundamental parameters of a cryptographic algorithm is the amount of data it can process
within a given period. The total throughput of the algorithm is expressed as Mbits/s and can be calculated
from T = f ×Radix where f is the clock frequency of the design (e.g. 5MHz). Since Trivium throughput
rate for SABL and S-CMOS designs are equal, in order to make a fair comparison, a new normalized
Table 2: Overall comparison for SABL and S-CMOS design of Trivium (All data are normalized)
Cipher Trivium Grain
Logic Style SABL S-CMOS SABL S-CMOS SABL S-CMOS SABL S-CMOS
Technology 0.13µm 0.35µm 0.13µm 0.35µm
Transistor Cost (A) 1 0.37 1 0.37 1 0.44 1 0.44
Power Consumption (P) 1 0.60 1 0.67 1 0.66 1 0.67
DPA Resistancy (DR) 1 0.0374 1 0.0435 1 0.045 1 0.043
Qualifying Factor (QF) 1 0.062 1 0.065 1 0.068 1 0.064
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Qualifying Factor (QF) is defined in (12):
QF =
DR×T
P×A (12)
Where, A, P, and DR corresponds to transistor cost, power consumption, and DPA resistancy re-
spectively. At the end of the simulations and data analysis we exhibited that SABL logic styles allow
to significantly decrease the supply current variations of both eSTREAM circuits. But still in both de-
signs very small current variations are detectable. As a disadvantage this could be a start of a DPA
attack since the predictability of the energy variations is more critical than their amplitude. It is clear
that decreasing the power consumption variations will affect all the stream cipher design components in
exactly the same way, and therefore not affect the SNR. Since DPA efficiency depends on the possibility
to predict the power consumption of a device in function of its input data and the value of the correlation
coefficient, the attack is still theoretically feasible against SABL circuits. But these current differences
are due to the presence of parasitic capacitances in the design and therefore, they cannot be predicted
without a precise transistor level knowledge of the circuit. As a consequence, an attacker can only target
one specific implementation and preliminarily needs to build a table containing the power consumption
differences in function of the circuit input data. These informations are not usually made available to the
users in full custom design. Moreover, under the assumption that we can perfectly predict and measure
the power consumption, a circuit resistance is equal for any logic style. Nevertheless, in practice, mea-
surements are not perfect and induce noise, independently of the logic style considered. This will cause
a reduction of the correlation values, depending on the power consumption variances, although it is hard
to evaluate and highly depends on the attacker measurement setup.
As can be seen in the Table 1 and Table 2 the DPA resistancy is improved for smaller minimum
feature sized designs. Although, current variations do not follow the scaling rules. This is mainly because
of clock feedthrough effect and also the former subthreshhold leakages which play a big roll in deep
submicron designs.
Stream ciphers always had the reputation of efficiency in hardware. Their smaller architecture helps
to use full custom design flow in order to have balanced routing of component wires. So simpler stream
cipher designs would have lower design costs. Regarding design flow, Trivium has lower hardware
complexity and circuit design is easier. Although Trivium has bigger architecture, timing constraints and
clock distribution of Trivium are the same as Grain. Comparing resistance against DPA attacks of the two
eSTREAM candidates, simulations show Grain has lower current spikes and smaller current variations.
This is thanks to the higher circuit complexity of Grain which combines different current variation of
gates to achieve a semi random supply current variation. Current spikes in Trivium are due to the higher
number of flip flops. Another disadvantage of Trivium is its large number of iterations in initialization
phase (1152 rounds) which let attackers to have more power traces.
8 Summary and Conclusions
This paper investigated the use of SABL logic to counteract power analysis attacks. In particular, an
efficient DPA resistive circuit for Grain v.1 and Trivium stream ciphers have been designed and compared
with their standard CMOS implementations. First we exhibited that SABL allow to significantly decrease
the circuit energy variations. This is due to equal amounts of power consumption in each clock cycle of
SABL gates. All implementations have been done on transistor level but in practice the cipher itself is
part of a system on chip with lots of other circuits which can increase PCons.+PNoise in (1) to achieve lower
SNR. Although SABL cannot be completely tamper resistant, this logic probably presents acceptable
security margins for general applications of stream ciphers. For future work interested researchers can
investigate some circuit changes in SABL styles to counteract other side channel attacks such as fault
attacks to obtain more security.
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